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Abstract
The paper [Howard E. Brandt, ”Conclusive eavesdropping in quantum
key distribution,” J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 7 (2005)] is
generalized to include the full range of error rates for the projectively
measured quantum cryptographic entangling probe, and also the full range
of inconclusive rates for the entangling probe measured with the POVM
receiver.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A design was recently given for an optimized entangling probe attacking the
BB84 (Bennett-Brassard 1984) protocol of quantum key distribution and yield-
ing maximum Renyi information to the probe [1], [2]. Probe photon polariza-
tion states become optimally entangled with the signal states on their way be-
tween the legitimate transmitter and receiver. Although standard von-Neumann
projective measurements of the probe yield maximum information on the pre-
privacy amplified key, if instead the probe measurements are performed with a
certain positive operator valued measure, then the measurement results are con-
clusive, at least some of the time [3]. It was assumed throughout that the error
rate E induced by the probe in the legitimate signal was such that 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/4
for the projectively measured probe. Here we extend the analysis to cover the
full range of theoretical interest, namely 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3.
1
2 GENERALIZED ENTANGLING PROBE
In the present work a generalization is given to include the full range of error
rates, 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, for the projectively measured quantum cryptographic
entangling probe, and the full range of inconclusive rates, 0 ≤ R? ≤ 1, for the
entangling probe measured with the POVM receiver. To accomplish this, the
following sign choices must be made for the probe parameter µ in Eqs. (26) and
(27) of [1]:
cosµ = [(1 + η)/2]1/2, (1)
sinµ = sgn(1− 4E)[(1 − η)/2]1/2, (2)
in which we define
sgn(x) ≡


1, x > 0
0, x = 0
−1, x < 0
(3)
One also has the definition, Eq. (75) of [1]:
η ≡ [8E(1− 2E)]1/2 . (4)
In this case, the probe states |A1〉, |A2〉, |α+〉, |α−〉, and |α〉 of [3] become:
|A1〉 ≡
[
1
2
(1 + η)
]1/2
|w0〉+ sgn(1 − 4E)
[
1
2
(1− η)
]1/2
|w3〉 , (5)
|A2〉 ≡ sgn(1− 4E)
[
1
2
(1− η)
]1/2
|w0〉+
[
1
2
(1 + η)
]1/2
|w3〉 , (6)
|α+〉 =
[(
21/2 + 1
)
(1 + η)
1/2
+ sgn(1− 4E)
(
21/2 − 1
)
(1− η)
1/2
]
|w0〉
+
[
sgn(1− 4E)
(
21/2 + 1
)
(1− η)1/2 +
(
21/2 − 1
)
(1 + η)1/2
]
|w3〉 , (7)
|α
−
〉 =
[(
21/2 − 1
)
(1 + η)1/2 + sgn(1− 4E)
(
21/2 + 1
)
(1− η)1/2
]
|w0〉
+
[
sgn(1− 4E)
(
21/2 − 1
)
(1− η)
1/2
+
(
21/2 + 1
)
(1 + η)
1/2
]
|w3〉 , (8)
|α〉 =
[
sgn(1− 4E) (1− η)
1/2
− (1 + η)
1/2
]
|w0〉
+
[
(1 + η)
1/2
− sgn(1− 4E) (1− η)
1/2
]
|w3〉 , (9)
respectively, where |w0〉 and |w3〉 are the orthonormal basis states in the two-
dimensional Hilbert space of the probe. As in [1], the upper sign choice in Eq.
2
(23) of [1] has been chosen. Note that Eqs. (5)-(9) are consistent with Eqs.
(5)-(7) and (11)-(14) of [3] for 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/4, as must be the case. It then
follows that Eqs. (1)-(4) of [3], along with Eqs. (7)-(9) above, now apply for
0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3. (Note that E = 1/3 corresponds to complete information gain by
the quantum cryptographic entangling probe.) Also the probe and measurement
implementations remain the same (as in [1], [2], [3]) with the initial state of the
probe now given by Eq. (6) or (21) below. In obtaining the maximum Renyi
information gain IRopt by the probe, Eq. (23) of [3], from Eqs. (7) and (8) above
and Eqs. (23) and (17) of [4] and the discussion following Eq. (75) of [1], one
first has
IRopt = log2(2−Q
2), (10)
and one readily obtains for the overlap Q of correlated probe states:
Q =
〈α+|α−〉
|α+||α−|
=
1 + 3sgn(1− 4E)(1 − η2)1/2
3 + sgn(1 − 4E)(1− η2)1/2
. (11)
Then substituting Eq. (4) in Eq. (11), one obtains
Q =
1 + 3sgn(1− 4E)((1− 4E)2)1/2
3 + sgn(1− 4E)((1 − 4E)2)1/2
, (12)
where we mean the positive square root; i.e.
((1 − 4E)2)1/2 = |1− 4E|. (13)
On noting that
sgn(1− 4E)|1− 4E| = 1− 4E, (14)
and substituting Eqs. (13) and (14) in Eq. (12), one obtains
Q =
1− 3E
1− E
. (15)
Finally, substituting Eq. (15) in Eq. (10), one obtains Eq. (23) of [3], namely,
IRopt = log2
[
2−
(
1− 3E
1− E
)2]
, (16)
for the full range of error rates, 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, as required.
From Eq. (31) of [3], one also concludes that the full range of inconclusive
rates R? apply, namely 0 ≤ R? ≤ 1. In this regard, it is useful, for the imple-
mentation of the entangling probe incorporating the POVM receiver to measure
the probe, to parameterize the states |A1〉 and |A2〉, and η, and sgn(1 − 4E)
above, along with Eqs. (29) and (33) of [3], in terms of the inconclusive rate.
Thus, using Eq. (31) of [3], it follows that the parameter E is
E =
1−R?
3−R?
. (17)
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Then the reflection coefficientR1 in the POVM receiver, Eq. (29) of [3], becomes
R1 =
1−R?
1 +R?
. (18)
Also, substituting Eq. (17) in Eqs. (3)-(6) above, one obtains
η =
2[2(1−R2
?
)]1/2
3−R?
, (19)
|A1〉 ≡
[
1
2
(1 + η)
]1/2
|w0〉+ sgn(3R? − 1)
[
1
2
(1− η)
]1/2
|w3〉 , (20)
|A2〉 ≡ sgn(3R? − 1)
[
1
2
(1 − η)
]1/2
|w0〉+
[
1
2
(1 + η)
]1/2
|w3〉 . (21)
Thus for the case of measurement of the probe with the POVM receiver, ac-
cording to Eq. (17), E can be treated as a parameter ranging form 0 to 1/3,
and determined by the set inconclusive rate R?. Also, the reflection coefficient
R1 of the POVM receiver must be set according to Eq. (18), by the inconclusive
rate. Finally, according to Eq. (21), the initial state |A2〉 of the probe can be
tuned to a set inconclusive rate of the POVM receiver.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, if the photon loss rate, due to
attenuation in the key distribution channel between the probe and the legiti-
mate receiver, equals the inconclusive rate R?, and only the conclusive states
are relayed by the probe to the legitimate receiver, then the entangling probe
together with the POVM receiver can obtain complete information on the pre-
privacy-amplified key, once the polarization bases are announced in the public
channel during reconciliation [3]. Also, to counter alteration in the attenuation
due to the probe, the legitimate channel may be replaced by a more transparent
one. One may therefore conclude that the BB84 protocol [5] has a vulnerability
very similar to the well-known vulnerability of the B92 (Bennett 1992) protocol
[6], [3], [7]. It is also possible that the popular Ekert protocol [8] has a sim-
ilar vulnerability. It is important to emphasize that, because for the present
implementation one has 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, the inconclusive rate, according to Eq.
(17), can range here from 0 to 1, and can match a corresponding loss rate in the
channel connecting the probe to the legitimate receiver. If the inconclusive rate
R? is chosen to match the loss rate in the channel connecting to the legitimate
receiver, then the initial state of the probe must be tuned (using a polarizer
located between the single-photon source and the target entrance port of the
CNOT gate) to the value given by Eq.(21).
3 CONCLUSION
The conclusive entangling probe, which incorporates the POVM receiver to
measure the quantum cryptographic entangling probe, is generalized to include
4
a full range of inconclusive rates. It follows that the inconclusive rate of the
POVM receiver can match any photon loss rate in the key distribution channel,
and the standard BB84 and Ekert protocols of quantum key distribution then
have vulnerabilities analogous to the well-known vulnerability of the standard
B92 protocol.
4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
References
[1] H. E. Brandt, “Quantum-cryptographic entangling probe,” Phys. Rev. A
71, 042312(14) (2005).
[2] H. E. Brandt, ”Design for a quantum cryptographic entangling probe,” to
appear in J. Mod. Optics (2005).
[3] H. E. Brandt, ”Conclusive eavesdropping in quantum key distribution,” J.
Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 7 (2005).
[4] H. E. Brandt, ”Probe optimization in four-state protocol of quantum cryp-
tography,” Phys. Rev. A 66, 032303(16) (2002).
[5] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: public key dis-
tribution and coin tossing,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Con-
ference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India
(IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175–179.
[6] C. H. Bennett, ”Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal
states,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121-3124 (1992).
[7] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, ”Quantum cryptography,”
Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145-195 (2002). (See p. 152.)
[8] A. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,” Phys. Rev.
Lett. 67, 661-663 (1991).
5
